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Abstract
Within an agent-based model where moral classifications are socially learned, we ask if a population
of agents behaves in a way that may be compared with conservative or liberal positions in the real
political spectrum. We assume that agents first experience a formative period, in which they adjust
their learning style acting as supervised Bayesian adaptive learners. The formative phase is followed
by a period of social influence by reinforcement learning. By comparing data generated by the agents
with data from a sample of 15000 Moral Foundation questionnaires we found the following. 1. The
number of information exchanges in the formative phase correlates positively with statistics identifying
liberals in the social influence phase. This is consistent with recent evidence that connects the dopamine
receptor D4-7R gene, political orientation and early age social clique size. 2. The learning algorithms that
result from the formative phase vary in the way they treat novelty and corroborative information with
more conservative-like agents treating it more equally than liberal-like agents. This is consistent with
the correlation between political affiliation and the Openness personality trait reported in the literature.
3. Under the increase of a model parameter interpreted as an external pressure, the statistics of liberal
agents resemble more those of conservative agents, consistent with reports on the consequences of external
threats on measures of conservatism. We also show that in the social influence phase liberal-like agents
readapt much faster than conservative-like agents when subjected to changes on the relevant set of moral
issues. This suggests a verifiable dynamical criterium for attaching liberal or conservative labels to groups.
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21 Introduction
A central controversy in moral psychology and sociology deals with understanding the variety of moral
values and whether adherence to one set or another have a genetic origin or arise from social interactions.
Political affiliation has been associated to social interaction, to genetics and to the combination of both
(e.g. [1–5]). We address questions about early age socialization, cognitive styles and political orientation
within a Moral Foundation theory (MFT) perspective using agent-based modelling and techniques from
information theory. The present work is culturally situated within the fields of sociophysics [6, 7] and
computational social sciences [8–10] and is a companion to our previous work [11–13].
In a series of papers Haidt and coworkers [14–20] have described MFT, an empirically driven theory
dealing with the foundations of moral psychology. It aims to understand statistically significant differences
in moral valuations of social issues and their association to coordinates of the political spectrum. The core
tenet of the theory is that moral issues, which are valued mostly in an intuitive manner, can be parsed into
a number of discrete dimensions, at least five, possibly six or even more. According to Kohlberg [21, 22]
and Gilligan [23] dimensions representing care/harm and fairness/cheating should be enough to span the
space of moral issues. Shweder et al [24] argued that the dimensions should be three instead.
The MFT states that dimensions representing loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion and sanctity-
/degradation should also be included in the moral space. The care/harm and fairness/cheating dimensions
are statistically more important for liberals than the rest, and each dimension of the entire set is of similar
importance for conservatives. Culture wars would be a consequence of these differences.
Consideration of other political cultures, such as libertarians leads to yet other dimensions, such as
liberty/oppression [25]. Political affiliation is also correlated with some characteristics of the Big Five
personality traits. Openness and liberal values appear together frequently while Conscientiousness and
conservatism are positively associated (e.g. [26]). Further associations between cognitive learning styles
and political affiliation have been suggested by EEG experiments [27].
In constructing the Motivated Social-Cognitive perspective Jost et al. [28, 29] make the assumption
“that conservative ideologies - like virtually all other belief systems - are adopted in part because they
satisfy some psychological needs”. We have also followed in our previous work [12, 13] a motivation
driven approach with a totally different methodology: studying mathematically the dynamics of agent-
based models using information theory. We considered the discomfort associated to disagreement [30]
3and the motivating pressure was to reduce pain associated to social exclusion. This was implemented
by a learning dynamics designed to maximize a utility function or, equivalently, minimize an energy-like
function. Haslam [31] correctly argues that not all social figuring is or should be a matter of cost/benefit
calculation. In a third person description, within a mathematical language, we calculate, but the social
agent does not calculate, it just acts.
In our previous approach we characterized in a simplified society of agents the effects of different
learning styles on the statistics of their opinions about a set of issues. We will call the artificial data set
to the data obtained by simulation of the agents. The analytical and numerical results were compared
to data gathered by the Moral Foundation Questionnaire project of Haidt and collaborators [32], to
which we will refer as the empirical data set. Agents learning with an algorithm that treated new and
corroborative information in the same way, exhibited (a) less dispersion of opinions, (b) longer times to
readapt under changes of the issues under discussion and (c) histograms of opinions very similar to those
of self declared conservatives in the empirical data set. On the other end of the spectrum of cognitive
styles, agents that could be thought to score higher in an Openness personality trait, since they gave
more importance to new data than to corroborative data, (a) showed greater dispersion of opinions, (b)
readapted faster after changes of the issues and (c) were statistically similar to self declared liberals.
Note that we avoided the difficult task of theoretically predefining conservative or liberal. We just
took a pragmatic route, comparing the results of our model with empirical data where subjects had
declared their belief about their positions in the political spectrum. In other words, a society of agents
is classified as conservative or liberal by the proximity of their statistical signatures to those obtained
from the Moral Foundation Questionnaires of groups who believe and declared to be of a certain political
affiliation.
In this paper we address the following question: why are different cognitive strategies present in
the population? Distal causes could be such as the advantages of societies with a higher cohesive set
of values due to conservatives and shorter readaptations due to liberals. If we ask for more proximate
causes, genetics or heterogeneous social interactions are possible explanations. A discussion by Smith
et al [33] illustrates the long path between genetics and opinions about specific issues, including four
intermediate levels: biological, cognitive/information processing, personality/values and ideology with
the environment influencing each one.
Fowler and collaborators presented evidence for interactions between genetics and politics. In [34]
4they link the DRD2 dopamine receptor to partisanship hereditability. More relevant to our present study,
is their analysis of data [35] from the National Longitudinal Adolescent Health study indicating that a
certain allele (7 repetitions long allele) of the dopamine receptor gene DRD4 may have just that kind of
influence. For those having two copies of the allele, the number of friends during early age condition the
probability of their self declared political affiliation as an adult. The direction is such that those that
had a larger number of friends are associated to a larger probability of being a liberal as an adult.
Here we aim at explaining the diversity in moral valuation within our agent based framework by
adopting an information theory point of view, in particular we consider an artificial society composed
by interacting Bayesian information processing agents. Each agent has a set of social neighbors and
exchanges information in the form of opinions about issues. Learning means that when the information
brought by the opinion of a social neighbor arrives, there are certain changes in the weights attributed
to each moral dimension.
The main results about the learning process following from this approach are two. First, that the
learning algorithm is not static but adaptive. It depends on the number of opinions to which an agent has
been exposed in social interactions. Second, that for different numbers of such opinions, the difference of
the ensuing learning algorithms can be described by the different modulation given to opinions that carry
novelty of information relative to opinions that carry corroborative information. Figure 1-left shows the
modulation function for different number of social interactions. The modulation function is a measure of
the overall scale of the changes of the weights for the moral dimensions elicited by a particular issue and
opinion of a social partner. Including the possibility of errors in communication, a Bayesian learner with
the information that there might be imperfect communication, acts with suspicion and ignores disagreeing
opinions on issues about which it has a strong opinion (Figure 1-right).
The agents of our model are Bayesian during an early window of time we call the formative phase.
Each ‘young’ agent is exposed to a random number of social information exchanges. At the end of the
formative phase the learning algorithm stops evolving and agents enter the social influence phase. Agents,
each with its particular fixed learning algorithm determined by the random socialization in the formative
phase, exchange information about a set of issues and continue learning. After a time where a steady
state has been achieved, we collect statistical information about the state of the society in the form of
histograms of opinions (the artificial data set, ADS). A similar set of statistics can be extracted from the
set of questions about moral issues (the empirical data set, EDS) collected by Haidt and collaborators
5from the Moral Foundation project [32] as done in [12,13]. Numerical comparisons of the statistics permit
identifying a class of agents with a group of respondents with a given declared political affiliation. The
conclusion is that the number of opinion exchanges in the formative phase is correlated with the political
affiliation of the corresponding group of the responders. Agents with large number of opinion exchanges
in the formative phase are identified with liberals after the social influence phase, those with a small
number are identified with conservatives.
In section 2 and appendices we present the mathematical aspects of the theory, first the Bayesian
algorithm of learning that evolves during the formative phase, then the description of the social influence
phase where agents interact. The rest of the paper has a descriptive approach where no mathematical
formalism is used. In section 3 we present the results and describe the comparison to the data obtained
from the Moral Foundation questionnaires. We end this paper with a discussion of the results, the
limitations of the theory and possible extensions.
2 Methods
2.1 Formative phase
Here we describe within a Bayesian framework the way agents process information. We suppose that
issues are parsed into a set of five numbers. An issue labeled µ is represented by xµ = {xaµ}a=1,...5, each
xaµ describing the bearing of its content on a moral dimension. Agents emit opinions in a fast, automatic,
intuitive manner independently of intricate if-then rules. In the model this is done by summing over the
five dimensions the content of each moral dimension of the issue, weighted by the importance the agent
attributes to each foundation. The moral state of agent i at time t, called the moral matrix in MFT, is
also a vector ωi(t) = {ωa,i(t)}a=1,...5. The opinion of agent i about issue µ is hi,µ =
∑5
a=1 ωa,ixa,µ and
its sign σi,µ = sign(hi,µ) shows whether an agent is for or against an issue.
During a social encounter in the formative phase an agent i receives information yµ = (σj,µ,xµ)
emitted by the social partner j. Learning occurs in order to decrease disagreement over issues. Within
this learning scenario, we hypothesize that evolutionary pressures to increase the prediction of the opinions
of others would select learning algorithms near Bayesian optimality (see [36]). As shown in Appendix A
the resulting learning algorithm that approximates a full Bayesian use of the available information, can
be described in two different ways. One as a motivational algorithm where a cost or energy like function
6E is decreased by the changes elicited by learning. The other as a modulated Hebbian learning algorithm
with the central concept, the modulation function Fmod (figure 1), being a measure of the importance
attributed to a given issue and the opinion of the interlocutor. In terms of the moral matrix ωˆa(t) and a
measure of the full social experience C(t), both ways are:
ωˆa,i(t+ 1) = ωˆa,i(t)− xa,µ+1σj,µ+1C(t)∂Eµ
∂zµ
,
= ωˆa,i(t) + xa,µ+1σj,µ+1Fmod, (1)
C(t+ 1) = C(t)− C(t)2 ∂
2Eµ
∂z2µ
,
= C(t) + C(t)
∂Fmod
∂zµ
. (2)
The modulation function and the cost are related by Fmod(z, C) = −C(t)∂Eµ∂z where zµ = σj,µ+1hi,µ
measures the concurrence/disagreement between agents i, the receiving agent, and agent j the opinion
emitting agent. C(t) is related to the width of the posterior distribution and decreases as learning occurs.
We also use ρ(t) = 1/
√
1 + C(t)2, a convenient variable since it takes values between zero and one. It is
close to zero when an agent had a small number of social encounters and approaches one as the number
increases. Hence the modulation function and the cost are functions of z and ρ.
The main results of this paper derive from the fact that the modulation function of the Bayesian
algorithm (1) is not the same throughout the learning period and changes as more information is incor-
porated and depends on the number of social encounters; and (2) it depends on the novelty that the
opinion of the social partner carries. These two aspects are clear in figure 1.Right, where the modulation
function is plotted as a function of z = hiσj , for different fixed values of ρ, which measures the number
of social interactions. Note that z = |hi|σiσj measures the strength |hi| of the opinion held by i and the
σiσj which is positive if the opinion σi prior to learning agent i is the same as the that of agent j and
the information is corroborative, and z < 0 if the opinions are opposite and the arriving information is
considered a novelty.
2.2 Social influence phase
We consider the number of information exchanges or socialization events in the formative phase as a
random number, not the same for all agents and thus the effective ρ for each agent is a number between
7zero and one. The agents in the formative phase learned to learn and now they just learn from each
other with a frozen modulation function. The validity of this supposition as something that represents
the development of adolescents has to be investigated in an independent way. It loosely rings with
Piagetian overtones [37]. We also consider the fact that people tend to interact with the likes [38]. So
we consider as a nonessential simplification, a system of agents all with the same ρ each one in a site
of a social lattice, exchanging information and then investigate the effect of changing ρ. The dynamics
of information exchange is analogous to that considered in [11–13], the only difference being that the
learning occurs with the Bayesian algorithm described above.
We suppose that a society discusses a set of P issues. Parsing of an issue into a vector might be
subjective, expressed by the fact that agent i obtains a vector xi. Exchange of information between
agents is about the average vector
Z ∝ 1
P
P∑
µ=1
xµi , (3)
which we suppose reasonable to be independent of the agent, since fluctuations due to subjective parsing,
if unbiased, tend to cancel out. We call Z the Zeitgeist vector since it captures the contributions of all
issues that are currently being discussed by the model society. Without any loss it will be normalized to
unit length. The opinion of agent k about the Zeitgeist is
hk = Z ·wk (4)
and its sign is denoted by σk = sign(hk). We now consider a Metropolis-like stochastic dynamics of
information exchange. The conjugate parameter β, determines the scale of tolerance to fluctuations in
the cost E , that is, it determines how important it is to conform to the opinions of others agents and
eventually sets the scale of fluctuations of an agent’s moral vector around the Zeitgeist.
2.3 Simulation
The artificial data is generated by the following procedure. We suppose that agents are characterized by
a learning algorithm parametrized by ρ depending on the number of social interactions they experienced
during the formative phase (see appendices A and B for details). We also suppose that agents only interact
with counterparts holding equal ρ. We choose a random social undirected graph from an ensemble here
8taken to be generated by a Barabasi-Albert model with N = 400 and m = 10. Our results are not
strongly dependent on the details of the social graph topology [13].
Agents start the social influence phase with moral weights that are represented by unitary vectors
ωi with random positive overlaps with a fixed Zeitgeist vector Z . The social influence dynamics is
implemented as a Markov Chain Monte Carlo process as follows. At each step an edge 〈ij〉 of the social
graph is randomly and uniformly chosen. One of its vertices (let it be i) is then marked as the influenced
agent with probability 1/2. The influenced agent chooses a random unit vector ω′i and changes her moral
weights ωi with probability given by min{1, exp (−β∆E)}, where ∆E =
∑
j∈neigh(i) [E(hi, σj)− E(h′i, σj)].
Note that the agent has complete access to his opinion hi, but only knows the sign of the influencer
opinion σj . Observe also that the pressure parameter β regulates the acceptance rate in the transition.
High pressure β makes moral representation changes more difficult.
Data are collected after the system reaches equilibrium. We typically wait Tterm = 6×104N interactions
before gathering uncorrelated samples for time averaged opinions hi that are used to build the histograms
depicted in Figure 2. To guarantee that samples are uncorrelated we calculate autocorrelation times τ
and then select properly spaced Tterm/τ samples. The whole procedure is repeated a n times until 500
independent samples are drawn (n = 4 being the minimum for the data we report). Our codes and
preprocessed data at available at [39]. Raw data for the Moral Foundations survey can be obtained
from [32].
2.4 Confrontation between artificial and empirical data
A society of agents is characterized by the values of ρ, measuring the effective socialization in the formative
phase, and of β that sets the pressure on the society during the social influence phase. While in a
society different agents with different ρ’s and feeling different β’s will interact, it is a reasonable first
approximation to consider that people will more likely interact in a meaningful manner with those that
are more similar.
In a steady state of a society of agents, changes in the moral matrices still occur, but the distribution
PADS(h|ρ, β) of opinions about the Zeitgeist are stable in time. From 15000 MFT questionnaires (see [13]
for a description of this data set) we obtained the data [32] and the following information. (i) {wa}a=1...5,
the (normalized) weights of the moral matrix and the political affiliation of each respondent. (ii) The
empirical Zeitgeist vector (Z e = {Za}a=1...5) defined as the average weight vector of the most conservative
9group. (iii) The empirical Zeitgeist opinion he =
∑
a waZa for each respondent. (iv) The empirical
distribution of opinions PEDS(h|pa) is obtained for each of the political affiliations pa.
A distance between the two distributions is measured
D(ρ, β; pa) =
∑
h∈bins
(PADS(h|ρ, β)− PEDS(h|pa))2 . (5)
by summing the quadratic difference over a set of bins of h. Figures 2 and 3 are obtained by identifying
the value of pa for the regions on the ρ−β space where D(ρ, β; pa) is smallest. If the smallest D(ρ, β; pa)
is larger than a threshold value of identification (e.g 0.1) then the point is not identified to any political
affiliation.
3 Results
3.1 Learning dynamics
We started with Bayesian learning and obtained two equivalent descriptions of the learning dynamics
describing changes in the weights of the moral dimensions. The dynamics described in equation 1 can be
seen to be a gradient descent: changes of the weights are in the direction of decreasing a quantity E that
can be interpreted as an energy, a cost or a pain.
We claim that this motivational (or utilitarian) form of learning can be useful to understand better
what is occurring. Then for each example the change occurs in the direction which tends to reduce the
error of classification, to increase conformism or to reduce pain derived from disagreement. But it is
just a mathematical fact that may go along uninterpreted and be described just as a Bayesian inspired
learning. We can describe the falling rock as moving along a trajectory that decreases potential energy.
It is not the rock that is being utilitarian or motivated to reduce an energy, but it is our description using
energy that seems utilitarian. The motivation lies in our third person description.
3.2 The modulation function
By using the idea of the modulation function we described (eq. 2) the same learning dynamics differently.
The modulation function measures the importance of the information carried by the example. It could be
thought in a loose way as representing the signal from something like an amygdala, which would signal
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more strongly in case the example causes surprise due to the novelty of an unexpected result.
In addition to measuring surprise, it is striking that it depends on ρ(t) = 1/
√
1 + C(t)2. What is
striking about a ρ dependent modulation is that in a static scenario and for an agent with only one social
partner we can prove [40] that ρ increases with the number of information exchanges, and this still holds
numerically when learning from several correlated social partners.
We now analyze the case shown in Figure 1-Left for noiseless communication. At the beginning of the
learning process the modulation function is flat. Every piece of information, every example receives the
same modulation. Being right or wrong is of little consequence in the manner in which the information
is incorporated. As learning occurs, from the information exchange with social partners, the modulation
function decreases for positive z and increases for negative z. Examples that carry new information start
getting a higher modulation. Those that were predicted correctly, are less effective in fostering changes
in the weights of the moral vector. Examples carrying new information make larger impacts, those that
corroborate the opinion of the agent, have a smaller influence. As ρ increases this effect is amplified.
In Figure 1-Right a noisy communication channel is introduced. With probability  (equal to 0.2
in the figure), the received opinion is flipped. But the agent doesn’t know which specific examples are
corrupted. The Bayesian algorithms permits incorporation of this information, the result is a distrust
effect. If the agent is very sure about its opinion (large absolute value of z), but it differs from that of
the social partner (z < 0), it tends to disregard the example by doing smaller changes in the weights.
This increases with the value of the noise level and with ρ.
To sum it up, the modulation has three characteristics which we list in decreasing order of importance.
The modulation function depends on
1. Novelty/Corroboration: a measure of whether the example carries new information ( z < 0) or is
corroborative (z > 0),
2. Socialization in the formative phase: a measure of the number of information exchanges (ρ),
3. Trust/distrust: a measure of the reliability attributed to the social partners. Given , if z is too
negative, the example is not considered new information but rather it is distrusted and its effect is
small.
We have analyzed the simple dynamics where the covariance is represented by a single parameter C or
equivalently ρ (see appendices for details). This is probably a good approximation but it is reasonable to
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assume that the dimensions may be interdependent. For example caring for a member of the group may
be larger than for a member of another group, also cheating an authority figure may be different than
cheating a common member of the group. This can be modeled by off diagonal terms in the covariance
matrix, that mix the moral dimensions of care and loyalty, in the first case or the fairness and authority
dimensions in the second. It is not clear at this point whether this means that there are different neural
circuits that deal with the dimensions but are interconnected, or if there exists combinations of dimensions
that are independent. This last option seems attractive from a mathematical point of view, being just
another case where diagonalization is useful. However the existence of interacting circuits is probably
more in accord with the fact that evolved language attributes specific names to them and not to their
combinations.
3.3 The political affiliation of Bayesian agents
Agents, of course, do not have a political affiliation. However we can measure the distribution of opinions
PADS(hi|ρ, β) after the formative phase, about the Zeitgeist vector for a society of agents all with the
same value of ρ and pressure β. Now we have a statistical signature that can be compared to a similar
signature extracted from the data of the Moral Foundation questionnaires for each political affiliation
group. This is similar to the methodology we used in [12] and [13]. This results in the identification
for fixed β, of the measure ρ of the formative phase, and the self-declared political affiliation of the
respondents of the questionnaires. This is done for several values of β and the result is shown in Figures
2 and 3. It is clear that the populations of agents with small value of ρ, or small number of social
information exchanges, are close to conservatives and those populations with high ρ or large number of
social information exchanges, are more likely to be identified with liberals. Note that this is not a one
to one identification. We are not saying that a given agent’s value of ρ determines political affiliations,
but rather that this subset of the population will have a distribution of opinions consistent with such
identification.
3.4 The phase diagram
The phase diagram is the instrument used to represent the variety of possible collective behaviors of
systems composed of many interacting units, in particular a society of agents. The phase boundary
separates regions of totally different properties. In Figure 4-Left we show the phase diagram in the space
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of parameters (ρ, β). Above the transition line which is the lower line, the society of agents has an ordered
phase. That there is some coherence of opinions in the society is shown by the fact that the average value
of the opinions is not zero. Below the transition line the model society is disordered in the sense that
opinions are so varied that they average to zero, opinions are not shared, the Zeitgeist is not clear. This
phase, the opposite of the ordered phase, resembles the anomie of Durkheim. The stripes follow regions
where the statistical signatures are similar to a certain political affiliation group.
3.5 Readaptation times
What is it that conservatives conserve? If a society of agents identified with conservatives (low ρ) were to
readapt after changes faster than one identified with liberals, our theory would have to be thrown away.
But it is a result of our theory that liberal-like societies are faster than conservative-likes in readapting.
Several approximately equivalent ways of defining relevant measures of readaptations times can be
introduced and we have looked at two such measurements and obtained similar results. After a steady
state was achieved and the steady state distribution PADS(h|ρ, β) is measured, the Zeitgeist Z old is
changed to a new Zeitgeist Z new. Call this time t = 0. After a sweep of information exchanges of all the
agents, t increases by one unit, the distribution of opinions about the new Zeitgeist Pt(h) is measured.
A distance between the two distributions is measured
D(t) =
∑
h∈bins
(Pt(h)− PADS(h|ρ, β))2 . (6)
by summing the quadratic difference over a set of bins. As usual the relaxation is exponential so we
parametrize D(t) = D0e
−t/T in terms of the adaptation time T which depends on ρ and β. For more
about this measure see [13].
A second possibility is the correlation time, defined by measuring the decay in time of the time
correlations. These are defined by the difference between the expected value of the product of the
moral vector at two different times and the product of their expected values c(t) =< m(t′ + t)m(t′) >
− < m(t′ + t) >< m(t′) > which also decays exponentially as c(t) ∝ exp(−t/τ) with a characteristic
relaxation time τ(β, ρ). Figure 4-Right shows the result of measuring numerically the relaxation times
of the different populations. At the transition line the relaxation time grows beyond any limit as ever
increasing populations are considered. This is called critical slowing down. Bellow the transition, the
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system is disordered and after the Zeitgeist change, it returns very quickly to the steady state. This
temporally and spatially uncorrelated region is uninteresting from the point of view that no data for an
analogous population in this region is currently available. Above the transition line, as we move to larger
β with fixed ρ, τ goes down very fast, attaining its minimum values near the regions of ultraliberals
and then has a monotonous rise into the conservative region. The shape of the regions where τ remains
approximately constant are similar in shape to the regions in the phase diagram identified with a given
political affiliation. This suggests that political affiliation could be empirically characterized by collective
relaxation time that increases as the political spectrum is transversed from groups conventionally labeled
as liberals to those labeled as conservatives.
3.6 Threats: Conservative shift under increase of pressure
The pressure parameter β determines how important it is to conform to the opinions of others. A more
detailed modelling of the agents could make a difference between informational or normative peer pressure.
Or the differences between situational or dispositional attributions of β. Economical or environmental
pressures could influence how the the social environment is perceived. Coarsely, β describes the overall
motivation that sets the scales of adaptation of beliefs. However it is set, it controls how strongly the
agent should conform to other opinions or to the overall current Zeitgeist. Technically, it determines the
scale of tolerance to fluctuations in the cost function E . Equivalently β sets the scale of fluctuations of
an agent’s moral vector around the Zeitgeist.
We can model the effect of an external event that threatens the group to which the agent belongs by
considering that the pressure β increases. The effects of the threat in the political affiliation of the agents,
shown in Figure 5-Left is that the population will shift towards the conservative end of the spectrum.
We supposed a fixed distribution of the number of social information exchanges ρ, and the effect on the
distribution of political affiliations before and after a threat which increases the peer pressure β. Our
model predicts also that under the perceived decrease of an external threat the populations will shift
towards the more liberal region.
We have defined the effective number of moral dimensions of a group with a given political affiliation.
This is done by averaging the weights over all members of the population and multiplying by the number
of moral dimensions dm = 5. For groups of agents that are identified with conservatives, the effective
moral dimension is near 4.8 . For those identified with liberals it is near 3.5. Both increase under increase
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of the peer pressure parameter β as shown in Figure 5-Right. This is in qualitative agreement with
experiments reported in [41–43] and further work in [44].
4 Discussion and Conclusions
The main characteristic of Entropic inference and the Bayesian approach to information theory is that
the mathematical structure to represent beliefs in the absence of complete information [45,46], if manifest
inconsistency is to be avoided, is probability theory. As presented in section 2 and in appendices A and
B a Bayesian study of the learning dynamics of moral classifications can be described as the changes in
the weight parameters for each dimension that lead to a decrease in the cost, interpreted as psychological
discomfort, caused by differences of opinions.
The main result we presented here is that the cognitive style of the Bayesian agent depends on the
complexity of the social interactions in the formative phase and cognitive style induces a statistical
association to political affiliation. The formative phase is a mimic of the pre-adolescent phase in the life
of an agent and the social influence phase is a mimic of the post-adolescence. During the social influence
phase the agent’s cognitive style is crystallized, so that it ceases to change, although the agent is still
capable of learning, then it follows that statistically the agents when identified with respondents of the
MFTQ, with the social complexity of the formative phase being positively correlated with liberalism. This
is exciting since in Settle et al. [35] the number of childhood friends is positively correlated to liberalism,
at least for those that have two alleles of the DRD4-R7 gene. They cautiously withhold from claiming
that a gene for political ideology was identified and just claim that evidence points to a gene-environment
interaction.
Within the context of [35] what is the genetic interpretation of our results? Our methods do not
address this problem. Genetically, having two long R7 DRD4 alleles, may contribute to making the
number of friends a proxy for social complexity in the formative phase. But some other genes may
contribute to Openness, with influence on the number of friends, thereby influencing the cognitive style
with respect to the differences of learning novelty and corroborations. But our approach does not address
this mechanism nor those by which other phenotypes become conservative or liberal. What we say is that
Bayesian optimal learning predicts that number of social interactions in the formative phase will correlate
with liberalism in the social influence phase. But, why should agents be Bayesian optimal? An answer can
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be given based on the results of, first, [40] where the functional optimization of the learning process was
obtained, second [47], where a related algorithm was shown to be the online version of the Bayes algorithm
and third [36] where, using evolutionary programming, the authors showed that perceptrons evolving
under pressure for having larger generalization ability, were driven to learning algorithms that resembled
Bayesian optimal algorithms both in functional form and performance. Thus if learning algorithms
for moral classification from examples, are subject to evolutionary pressures for better generalization,
Bayesian optimal like algorithms will be approximated. Cognitive styles will then depend on social
interactions at the earlier phase in the life of the agent. A question that remains is why there would be
a formative phase, for learning how to learn and setting overall parameters, and a social influence phase,
for actual learning. These questions are outside of our scope and will need other methods and inputs.
What are the predictions of the model? These are summarized in table 1. Relaxation times were
never used in the theoretical formulation of the problem. They are a physical consequence of the social
information exchanges and hence a prediction of the model. Different cognitive styles, through social
interactions, lead to different adaptation times. The existence of a phase transition between an ordered
moral phase and a moral disordered phase might not be observable since societies morally disordered
might not exist. However this model can be applied to other culturally relevant landscapes, where groups
on both sides of the divide might be found. A question that remains is if in those contexts, pressure will
lead to Bayesian optimality resulting in cognitive style diversity.
Another prediction of the model is that under an increase of β, the peer pressure, a society as a
group will tend to seem statistically more conservative, as shown in Figure 5. This effect of peer pressure
increase might be behind the results of Bonanno and Jost [41] and Nail et al [42] about the increased
conservatism of subjects that were exposed to the 9/11 attack. However Nail et al [43] show that there
is no need for social interaction in order to become more conservative, suggesting that our interpretation
of β as peer pressure could be extended to a self-regulated parameter that is adjusted dynamically from
information about social context.
An empirical definition and consequent measure of pressure might be done following the methodology
of [48] where nations were classified on a tight/loose scale. Analysis of morality data sets for individual
countries could point out if our pressure and their tight/loose scale are related. Since we use only USA
citizens questionnaires, we are not able to address this question here, leaving the issue for a forthcoming
paper.
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An important characteristic of our model is that it is semantically free. Just or loyal in the mathemat-
ical space where the agents are defined are concepts devoid of meaning. We believe that this aspect has
to be addressed from an evolutionary perspective in order to understand the emergence of the dimensions
and hence provide our mathematical backbone of a semantic dressing.
Table 1. Predictions of the model of Bayesian Agents . Left: Variables refer to the Bayesian Agent
Model. Right: Compared to the data from the Moral Foundations project.
Variable Prediction
Cognitive style: novelty ≈ corroborations Correlates with conservatism
Cognitive style: novelty > corroborations Correlates with liberalism
Social complexity in formative phase ρ Correlates with liberalism
Correlation times τ Correlates with conservatism
Increase in pressure β Liberals look statistically more like conservatives
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A The model and methods
A short description of the learning theory is presented below and in the following appendices.
Each agent is endowed with a learning system and a set of weights. They exchange information,
learning and teaching at different instances, about a set of issues, represented each by a set of numbers.
Each number represents the bearing of the issue on one of the moral dimensions. The dimension of the
moral space, according to MFT is around five or six. The development of the mathematical theory can
be done for a general number of dimensions dm. A choice has to be made in order to compare with
data, and since we are only comparing with a set of questionnaires of conservatives and liberals, will use
dm = 5 in the numerical part of the calculations. So, a statement or issue to be morally judged, at a
time labelled by µ is represented as a vector in moral space xµ = (x1,µ, x2,µ, x3,µ, x4,µ, x5,µ) with five
components. For a particular agent, call it i, the moral state of the agent, called the moral matrix in
MFT, is also a vector ωi = (ω1,i, ω2,i, ω3,i, ω4,i, ω5,i).
Moral judgements are taken to be intuitive, fast, not based on intricate rules. We suppose opinions
to be constructed by the average of the components of the issue, weighted by the values of the moral
dimensions: hi,µ =
∑dm
a=1 ωa,ixa,µ is the opinion of agent i about issue xµ. Furthermore we introduce the
sign, for or against, of the opinion σi,µ = sign(hi,µ) about the issue.
We model social encounters when agent i receives information yµ = (σj,µ,xµ) emitted by the social
partner j. Since the length of the vector xµ does not alter the opinions σ, we take all issues to be unit
length.
Call Dµ = {y1, y2, ....yµ} the set of all such pairs received until that time.
To take into account our limited access to information we have to use a probabilistic framework. Let
P (ω|Dµ) describe our knowledge of the vector of moral dimensions ω conditional on the information the
agent received until now Dµ, composed of all the pairs up to time µ. Now a new pair yµ+1 is received
and the probability of having a particular moral dimension ω changes. That is the essence of learning.
The basic relation of inference is drawn from Bayes theorem. If P (ω|Dµ) is the probability posterior to
the consideration of the data set Dµ and prior to the inclusion of the information contained in the pair
yµ+1, the basic assumption in Bayesian learning is to use the old posterior P (ω|Dµ) as the new prior.
Then we can write for the updated distribution of the receiving agent
P (ω|Dµ+1) ∝ P (ω|Dµ)P (σi,µ+1 = σj,µ+1|ω, Dµ,xµ+1) (7)
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The likelihood P (σi µ+1 = σj,µ+1|ω, Dµ,xµ+1) describes the probability that agent i would have opinion
σi µ+1 = σj,µ+1 about issue xµ+1 if its moral vector were ω.
For simplicity we consider an approximation where the probability distributions are multivariate
Gaussians. This family can be described by two objects: a mean vector (ωˆ) and a covariance matrix
(C). Now the dynamics of learning can be simply written by giving the changes in these two quantities
due to the incorporation of the information in the example yµ+1. After some manipulations (see B below
and [47]), the learning dynamics of agent i is described in terms of the components by
ωˆa,µ+1 = ωˆa,µ −
∑
b
Cab,µ · ∂Eµ
∂ωˆbµ
, (8)
Cab,µ+1 = Cab,µ −
∑
cd
Cac,µCbd,µ
∂2Eµ
∂ωˆc,µ∂ωˆd,µ
(9)
and Eµ, that can be called the learning energy or cost or pain, is given by
Eµ = − ln 〈P (hµ|ωˆµ + u)〉 (10)
where hµ =
∑
a ωˆa,µxa,µ+1 is the opinion of the agent about issue xµ+1 before receiving the opinion of
the social partner. The average, represented by the angular brackets, is over the gaussian variable u
with zero mean and covariance Cab,µ. Note that 〈P (hµ|ωˆ + u)〉µ is also called the evidence. It is in the
likelihood that enters the information about how an issue and a moral vector give rise to an opinion and
the noise process that is corrupting the communication.
A.1 Bayesian learning dynamics in the formative phase
Different types of noise can enter in the communication process. Here we suppose the case of multiplicative
noise where a fraction  of the opinions are inverted. The form of the learning potential can be written
as
Eµ(z) = log
(
+ (1− 2)Φ
(
z
xTµ+1Cµxµ+1
))
(11)
where z = σj,µ+1hi,µ and Φ is the cumulative distribution of the gaussian N (0, 1). To simplify the
interpretation of the results, at the expense of small degradation in the performance of the learning
algorithm we consider the case where the covariance has the the from Cµ = Cµ1, an overall factor Cµ
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times a unit matrix. In this approximation xTµ+1Cµxµ+1 = Cµ. Then the dynamics is
ωˆa,µ+1 = ωˆa,µ − xa,µ+1σj,µ+1Cµ ∂Eµ
∂z
, (12)
Cµ+1 = Cµ − C2µ
∂2Eµ
∂z2
. (13)
This dynamics and variations for other learning scenarios has been extensively analyzed in [40,47,49–
56]. We now make some comments that are relevant for our present purposes.
A.2 The learning algorithm
We introduce the modulation function (figure 1) Fmod(z) = −Cµ ∂Eµ∂z and write the dynamics as
ωˆa,µ+1 = ωˆa,µ + xa,µ+1σj,µ+1Fmod(zµ), (14)
Cµ+1 = Cµ + Cµ
∂Fmod(zµ)
∂zµ
. (15)
Learning is now seen as a modulated Hebbian learning, where changes in the weights are done in the
direction of the vector xµ+1, if the social partner’s opinion σµ+1 about it is positive and in the opposite
direction it the opinion is negative. In Figure 1 in the main text, the modulation function
Fmod(zµ) =
(1− 2) exp− z
2
µ
2C2µ
+ (1− 2)Φ
(
zµ
Cµ
) (16)
is plotted as a function of z. Note that z takes positive values if the opinion of the agent and its social
partner are the same and is negative if there is disagreement. If the absolute value of z is large the
agent can be said to be very sure about its opinion since small changes in the issue will not change its
classification.
But more strikingly, the modulation function depends on C. In Figure 1 we present Fmod(z) for
different values of ρ = 1/
√
1 + C2, a convenient variable since it takes values between zero and one.
It is close to zero when the agent’s opinion has probability around one half of agreeing with that of
the social partner. As learning occurs, ρ increases towards one. It can be shown that ρ is related to
the probability eg of the opinions being different on a random issue, and eg goes to zero as ρ → 1.
In particular eg =
1
piaccos
−1ρ for large dm and uniform and independently distributed examples and it
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remains a useful variable in other conditions.
A.3 Social influence phase
We consider that the information exchanges in the formative phase occur at random and thus the effective
ρ for each agent is a random number. Now we freeze the evolution of the modulation function, ρ or
equivalently C is fixed at a particular value for each agent. We consider the agents to start a new phase
in their lives where the value of ρ does not change anymore. The agents in the formative phase learned
to learn and now they just learn from each other. The validity of this supposition as something that
represents the developments of adolescents has to be investigated in an independent way.
The dynamics of information exchange is analogous to that considered in [12,13], the only difference
being that the learning occurs with the Bayesian algorithm described above.
We suppose that a society discusses a set of P issues. Parsing of an issue into a vector might be
subjective, expressed by the fact that agent i obtains a vector xi. Exchange of information between
agents is about the average vector
Z ∝ 1
P
P∑
µ=1
xµi , (17)
which we suppose reasonable to be independent of the agent, since fluctuations due to subjective parsing,
if unbiased, tend to cancel out. We call Z the Zeitgeist vector since it captures the contributions of all
issues that are currently being discussed by the society. Without any loss it will be normalized to unit
length. The opinion of agent k about the Zeitgeist is
hk = Z ·wk (18)
and its sign is denoted by σk = sign(hk). We now consider a Metropolis-like stochastic dynamics of
information exchange. Pick at random one agent, call i. Pick its social partner, call it j uniformly from
its social neighbors. Now choose a dm dimensional vector u drawn uniformly on a ball of radius κ. A
trial weight vector is defined by
T =
wi(t) + u
|wi(t) + u| (19)
and accepted as the new weight vector, wi(t + 1) = T if the learning energy : ∆E := E(T, σj) −
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E(wi(t), σj) ≤ 0. If ∆E > 0 the change is accepted with probability exp−β∆E . In analogy to equation
11
E(wi, σj) = log
(
+ (1− 2)Φ
(
hiσj
C
))
(20)
This is looped randomly over the whole population. A technical comment is that it is not obvious
if this dynamics leads to an equilibrium state since the energy E is not symmetric with respect to the
interchange of the two actor agents: the emitter and the receiver of the information. However numerically,
order parameters rapidly converge to values that remain stationary during thousands of iterations, a time
scale that we consider sufficient to study a steady state and further to consider the effects of Zeitgeist
changes and readaptations. Within certain limits κ controls the acceptance rate and thus the time scales
to reach stationary values.
The value of β sets the scale of fluctuations of the energy E . If β is large, even small changes ∆E
have large effects and large changes will not be possible, and if β is small, then large fluctuations may
be easily accepted. Our interpretation is that β serves as a pressure to accommodate and conform to the
opinion of others. Large β means strict conformity, while in a small β regime, tolerance to fluctuations
in conformity are accepted.
B Bayesian inspired learning algorithms
For the learning set Dt = (y0, . . . , yt−1) of independently chosen vectors and their opinions, the likelihood
is a product
P (Dt|ω) =
t−1∏
i=0
P (yi|ω) (21)
where ω is the set parameters to be inferred. The data comes in ordered pairs yt = (σj,t,xt) where
σj,t is positive if agent j considers issue xt as a morally acceptable issue and negative otherwise; xt =
(x1t , . . . , x
N
t ) is a five dimensional vector. Our choice of N = 5 is determined by Moral Foundation theory.
Bayesian inference derives from the application of Bayes theorem in order to incorporate information
that permits updating from a prior to a posterior distribution:
P (ω|Dt) = P (ω)P (Dt|ω)∫
dω′P (ω′)P (Dt|ω′) (22)
22
In Online learning we consider the updating of the distribution due to the addition of a single example
pair yt+1
P (ω|Dt+1) = P (ω|Dt)P (yt|ω)∫
dω′P (ω′|Dt)P (yt|ω′) . (23)
The amount of memory needed to store the whole posterior can be prohibitively large and following
Opper [47] we consider a simplification where the posterior is constrained to belong to a parametric
family, which we take to be the N dimensional multivariate Gaussian.
If at a certain stage our knowledge is codified into one such Gaussian,
PG(ω|Dt) = 1|2pi detCt| 12
exp
(
−1
2
(ω − ωˆt)T C−1t (ω − ωˆt)
)
(24)
a Bayesian update will in general take the posterior out of the Gaussian space. Then a new Gaussian
posterior is chosen is such a way that the information loss is minimized. Thus the learning step is
comprised of two sub-steps:
• New example drives the posterior out of the Gaussian space :
P (ω|Dt+1) := P (ω|Dt, yt) = PG(ω|Dt)P (yt|ω)∫
dω′PG(ω′|Dt)P (yt|ω′) (25)
• Project back to Gaussian space:
P (ω|Dt+1)→ PG(ω|Dt+1) (26)
The projection step is done using the Kullback-Leibler divergence or equivalently, by maximizing
the cross entropy:
KL[P (ω|Dt+1)||PG(ω|Dt+1)]
=
∫
dωP (ω|Dt, yt) log P (ω|Dt+1)PG(ω|Dt+1) (27)
The minimization of the KL divergence results in projecting into the Gaussian with the same mean and
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covariance vector as the non-Gaussian posterior:
ωˆt+1 =
∫
dωωP (ω|Dt+1)P (yt|ω)∫
dωP (ω|Dt+1)P (yt|ω)
Ct+1 =
∫
dωωωTP (ω|Dt+1)P (yt|ω)∫
dωP (ω|Dt+1)P (yt|ω) − ωˆt+1ωˆTt+1. (28)
Now change variables, introducing u the fluctuations around the mean ω = ωˆt + u. Using that for
Gaussians with zero mean IE(xf(x)) = IE(x2)IE(f ′(x)) and df(x+y)dx =
df(x+y)
dy then it follows that the
new mean and covariance change as described by equations 1, 2 (main text), 8 and 9 in A.
C Comparing ERN and the modulation function
The modulation function determines the size of the weight changes during learning. We define the average
of the modulation function for novelty 〈Fmod〉novelty and 〈Fmod〉corroboration by
〈Fmod〉novelty = 〈F 〉−1
∫ 0
−∞
Fmod(z)P (z)dz,
〈Fmod〉corroboration = 〈F 〉−1
∫ ∞
0
Fmod(z)P (z)dz,
〈F 〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
Fmod(z)P (z)dz.
For a unifomr distribution of examples, and with the normalization of ω, the distribution P (z) of z = hσ,
is the gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance. Since the modulation function depends
on ρ, the difference
∆F = 〈Fmod〉novelty − 〈Fmod〉corroboration (29)
can be identified to a political affiliation. This is shown in figure 3.c. This is the closest we can come
theoretically to defining within the model a quantity similar to the Error Related Negativity (ERN)
measured by Amodio et al [27] which reports differences between measured EEG signals of unexpected
and expected situations conditional on self-declared political affiliations. In figure 3.d we show the results
from [27] for the magnitude of the ERN signal versus political affiliations.
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Figure 1. The modulation function depends on the a measure of novelty and on the number of
social opinion exchanges. Left panel: Total confidence on the information received. Right panel: Agent
suspects that some received opinions have been randomly inverted (20%). The vertical axes are the modulation
functions and in the horizontal axes appears the product of the prior opinion of the agent (h) times the sign (σ)
of the arriving opinion information. Social interactions with opinions where hσ < 0 bring new information, those
with hσ > 0 are corroborative. The different curves are drawn each for different numbers of total opinions to
which the agent has been exposed, measured by ρ which increases as shown by the arrow (↓). The modulation
function changes from almost a constant, for very small number of social opinion exchanges, to a very
asymmetrical form where repetitive information causes almost no change at all and novelty gives rise to a very
high modulation of changes, except when a level of distrust has been surpassed, as in the very negative region of
hσ in the right panel. See Appendix B for details.
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Figure 2. Comparison with empirical data. Empirical opinions (histograms in orange) correspond
to the overlap between moral weights obtained by MFT questionnaires and the average weight of the
most conservative group (Zeitgeist direction Z ). The histogram obtained by simulating social influence
in a social network with homogeneous learning styles (homogeneous ρ) and computing overlaps between
moral weights of a the agents and a given Zeitgeist direction (Z = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) in the simulation) are
represented by the black line. In each graph we find rho that best fits the empirical histogram for
pressure β = 3.8 and for each political affiliation group. Simulations are performed on a Barabsi-Albert
network with N = 400 and average degree 20.
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Figure 3. Model versus experiment. Model results: panels (a) and (c). Experimental results from
data published in [35] (panel (b)) and in [27] (panel (d)). (a) Model: Political affiliation (pa= 1-Liberal,
pa=7-Very Conservative) is correlated to ρ, which is a measure of the number of social information
exchanges in the formative phase of the agents’ lives. This occurs for a wide range of pressures β values.
(b) Data: Number of friendships in people with the two alleles of DRD4-7R correlates with
liberalism [35]. (c) Model: Difference between average modulation in novel and corroborative situations,
∆F = 〈Fmod〉novelty − 〈Fmod〉corroboration. correlates with liberalism (see section C.) (d) Data:
magnitude of ERN difference between novelty and corroboration in go-no-go game from [27] correlates
with liberalism.
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Figure 4. Phase diagram and relaxation times. Left: The phase diagram in the space ρ, a
measure of the complexity of socializations versus β the pressure. The stripes represent regions of the
space of parameters where agents could be statistically identified with a group with a given political
affiliation. The lower line represents the boundary between order (above) and disordered (below)
societies. Below the transition line, and for very large β, no identification with MFT questionnaire
respondents was found. Right: Color coded relaxation times after changes in the set of moral issues.
Note that at the transition relaxation times are very large. This is called critical slowing down. For the
agents identified with respondents of the MFTQ, the lowest times correspond to those liberal identified
agents and the largest times to conservative identified agents. The line just above the transition shows
the locus of minimum correlation time as a function of β, for fixed ρ.
Figure 5. Threats. Left: The number of effectively conservative agents changes with pressure. If the
population has a distribution of social encounters as shown in the bottom panel, the resulting
distributions of political affiliations changes, for different pressures as shown in the left panel. Right:
The effective number of moral dimensions for two values of the pressure, before and after an external
threat. If a threat leads to increased pressure, the statistical signature of liberals agents will look more
like that of conservatives.
